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Abstract
Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism.
For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve
price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the bidders are willing to pay.
A mechanism designer can potentially learn about the participants’ preferences by observing
historical data from the mechanism; the designer could then update the mechanism in response
to learned preferences to improve its performance. The challenge of such an approach is that
the data corresponds to the actions of the participants and not their preferences. Preferences
can potentially be inferred from actions but the degree of inference possible depends on the
mechanism. In the optimal auction example, it is impossible to learn anything about preferences
of bidders who are not willing to pay the reserve price. These bidders will not cast bids in the
auction and, from historical bid data, the auctioneer could never learn that lowering the reserve
price would give a higher revenue (even if it would). To address this impossibility, the auctioneer
could sacrifice revenue optimality in the initial auction to obtain better inference properties so
that the auction’s parameters can be adapted to changing preferences in the future. This paper
develops the theory for optimal mechanism design subject to good inferability.
1 Introduction
The promise of data science is that if data from a system can be recorded and understood then this
understanding can potentially be utilized to improve the system. Behavioral and economic data,
however, is different from scientific data in that it is subjective to the system. Behavior changes
with system changes, and to predict behavior for any given system change or to optimize over
system changes, the model that generates the behavior must be inferred from the behavior. The
ease with which this inference can be performed generally also depends on the system. Trivially,
a system that ignores behavior does not admit any inference of a behavior generating model that
can be used to predict behavior in a system that is responsive to behavior. To realize the promise
of data science in economic systems, a theory for the design of such systems must also incorporate
the desired inference properties.
Consider as an example the revenue-maximizing auctioneer. If the auctioneer has knowledge of
the distribution of bidder values then she can run the first-price auction with a reserve price that
is tuned to the distribution. Under some mild distributional assumptions, with the appropriate
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reserve price the first-price auction is revenue optimal (Myerson, 1981). Notice that the historical
bid data for the first-price auction with a reserve price will never have bids for bidders whose values
are below the reserve. Therefore, there is no data analysis that the auctioneer can perform that
will enable properties of the distribution of bidder values below the reserve price to be inferred. It
could be, nonetheless, that over time the population of potential bidders evolves and the optimal
reserve price lowers. This change could go completely unnoticed in the auctioneer’s data. The two
main tools for optimizing revenue in an auction are reserve prices (as above) and ironing.1 Both
of these tools cause pooling behavior (i.e., bidders with distinct values take the same action) and
economic inference cannot thereafter differentiate these pooled bidders. In order to maintain the
distributional knowledge necessary to be able to run a good auction in the long term, the auctioneer
must sacrifice the short-term revenue by running a non-revenue-optimal auction.
Economic inference in auctions is based on a very straightforward premise. We, the analyst,
would like to infer the values of bidders from their bids. This is possible because a bidder’s bid
is in best response to the bid distribution and the bid distribution is observed in the data. Given
any value for a bidder, and the empirical distribution of bids, we can solve for the bidder’s utility
maximizing bid. The resulting bid function can be easily obtained, and bids can be mapped to
ranges of values via the inverse of this function. If the true equilibrium bid distribution is continuous
with strictly positive density then both the noise in estimation and the width of the estimated value
intervals vanish as the size of the observed data set increases. Notice that our earlier observation
that nothing can be learned about the value distribution below the reserve price (or in an ironed
interval) corresponds to the probability that a bidder is served being constant for bids within a
given interval; The bid distribution would have zero density on this interval.
Our examples above that demonstrate a failure to perform economic inference are extreme in
that the failure was due to total unresponsiveness of the mechanism. Intuitively, the degree to which
good inference is possible should depend on the degree of responsiveness. The ideal econometric
model for inference, however, does not separate mechanisms by the degree of responsiveness. As
an example, consider auctioning a single item to one of 100 agents by the highest-bid-wins auction
with either first-price or all-pay semantics. With first-price semantics only the winner pays his
bid; with all-pay semantics all bidders pay their bids. Consider a bidder with value close to the
median of the distribution. With the first-price auction the bidder bids by shading his value to
the expected highest-other-bid given that his bid is the highest. For most continuous distributions,
this is slightly below his value. With the all-pay auction, relative to the first-price bid, the bidder
also reduces his bid by a multiplicative factor proportional to his likelihood of being the highest
bidder. For a median value bidder with 99 other bidders, this probability is 2−99. In contrast to the
first-price auction where determining a reasonable bid is relatively easy, it is unlikely that a bidder
would respond in an all-pay auction to a degree of accuracy that allows inference. As described
above, the classical model for inference suggests that, in both cases, the value distribution can be
inferred to a precision that vanishes with the number of observations. Our theory will enable the
distinction of these two mechanisms as one with good inference and one with bad inference.
In summary, the goal of this work is in a theory for the design of mechanisms that perform
1Optimal auctions are constructed by mapping values to virtual values and then optimizing the virtual surplus
(i.e., the sum of the the virtual values of agents who are served). Reserve prices exclude bidders with negative virtual
values; bidders with value below the reserve price may as well not show up at the auction. Ironing comes from the
process of constructing virtual values where a non-monotone virtual value function is “ironed” to be flat. When two
or more bidders have the same virtual value they receive the same service probability (and payment); bidders in an
ironed interval may as well make the same bid.
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well in terms of revenue and inference. The motivating story that the theory should resolve is that
of a revenue-maximizing auctioneer continuously adapting an auction in a slowly changing world.
As the distribution of agent preferences evolves, the equilibrium behavior evolves, and the designer
observes behavior and adapts the mechanism.
Model and Justification To explore this question of optimization of revenue of auctions with
good inference we consider the following auction and bidding model. The auction design space is
given by a position auction environment and either first-price or all-pay semantics. There are n
agents and n positions and each position has a corresponding service probability. The auctioneer
may modify the position weights by moving service probability from high positions to low positions
(or discarding) and then runs a rank-by-bid position auction on the modified position weights.
The bidders are single-dimensional with private values drawn independently and identically from
a common prior distribution, have linear utility given by their value for service received minus any
payment made, and bid in Bayes-Nash equilibrium (i.e., the model of classical auction theory).
Discussion of these modeling choices follows.
We choose position auction environments because good revenue can only be obtained by opti-
mization over the whole range of the distribution of values; therefore, good inference is especially
important. For example, reserve pricing alone cannot achieve better than a logarithmic (in the
number of agents) approximation to the optimal auction (Hartline and Yan, 2011). This choice,
then places the problem in an environment where even obtaining a constant approximation to the
optimal revenue is non-trivial. Aiming for a constant approximation will allow us to identify simple
mechanisms that provide economic intuition; whereas, optimal mechanisms may be analytically
intractable and economically opaque.
We choose to restrict the auctioneer to rank-based auctions where the position auction can be
modified by shifting service probability downward (or discarding); importantly we disallow reserve
prices or ironing (by value). Three reasons follow. First, as observed above, reserve prices and
ironing do not permit good inference. Second, rank-based first-price and all-pay position auctions
have a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium that is symmetric and in which bids are always in the same
order as values; therefore, the equilibrium allocation rule is predetermined by the position weights
alone (Chawla and Hartline, 2013). Third, as a result that we will prove, both reserve prices and
ironing can be simulated by shifting probability downward (or discarding) with at most a constant
factor loss in revenue. Furthermore, the optimal rank-based auction (which obtains at least the
revenue of this simulation) can be obtained by ironing by rank and discarding low ranks only.
Ironing by rank considers a set of consecutive position and averages their service probabilities.
Thus, this restriction is without loss up to a constant approximation.
We choose first-price and all-pay payment semantics because they are fundamental auction types
with non-truthtelling equilibrium in the classical model for auction theory. This choice contrasts
with the standard choice in the mechanism design literature where attention is often restricted to
mechanisms with the truthtelling equilibrium. Of course, for truthful mechanisms in the classical
model, bids are equal to values and inference is trivial. In practice, however, these nice-in-theory
auctions are rarely employed. Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) give some explanation for this non-
translation from theory to practice in an essay entitled “The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction.”
Moreover, even if an auction possessing a truthtelling equilibrium in theory is employed in practice,
truthtelling is unlikely. This loss of truthtelling could come from externalities, exposure, outside
options, or privacy concerns. In contrast, our restriction to first-price and all-pay auctions permits
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the consideration of inference in the classical, and most fundamental, model of auction theory.
Results and organization Our results are as follows.
• In Section 2 we show how to estimate the bid distribution from a finite sample of observed bids.
Then we provide a general principle for inferring values from the estimated distribution of bids
and its derivative for a non-truthful mechanism. We illustrate this principle in application to
a first price and an all-pay mechanism.
• We prove in Section 3 that rank based auctions are close to optimal for revenue: for every
value distribution and every symmetric auction facing a position feasibility constraint2, there
exists a rank based auction satisfying the same constraint that achieves a 4-approximation
(and in most cases, a close-to-1 approximation). Further, we prove that optimizing for revenue
over the class of rank based auctions requires knowing n parameters of the value distribution
that we call the multi-unit revenues. These multi-unit revenues are a discrete analog to the
revenue curve, the derivative of which defines virtual values for revenue-optimal auctions.
• We show how to estimate the multi-unit revenues from samples drawn from the bid distribu-
tion of a mechanism in Section 4. We give bounds on the error in estimation in terms of the
allocation rule of the mechanism, and the number of bid samples. We show that the error
decreases as the inverse square root of the number of bid samples.
• Also in Section 4, we show that rank based auctions achieve a good revenue versus inference
tradeoff: for every ǫ > 0, there exists a rank based auction that obtains a (1− ǫ) fraction of
the optimal rank based revenue, and achieves error in inferring the multi-unit revenues that
scales as O(1/ǫ).3
• We show how to estimate the revenue curve for the underlying value distribution from samples
drawn from the bid distribution of a mechanism in Section 5. We give bounds on the error
in estimation in terms of the allocation rule of the mechanism, the number of bid samples,
and the measurement error in bids. These bounds require the allocation function to have a
minimum and a maximum slope at all quantiles. An implication is that the revenue-optimal
auction (with a mostly “flat” allocation rule) is generally poor at inference and requires
substantially larger samples to achieve the inference qualtify of the iron by rank auctions.
We show that the dependence of the estimation error on the aforementioned parameters is
polynomially worse in this setting as compared to those for the problem of learning just the
multi-unit revenues.
Related Work The inference approaches that we use in this paper are related to the recent
work in econometrics literature on the so-called plug-in estimation of strategic response models.
For instance, Guerre et al. (2000) analyzes the estimation of the distribution of values from the
distribution of bids in the first-price auction. An overview of related empirical models applied to
other auction environments can be found in Paarsch and Hong (2006). The principle for inference in
2For irregular value distributions, we need the assumption that the auction does not iron over the values corre-
sponding to the highest 1/n quantiles.
3Note that this scaling in error can be offset by obtaining a large number of bid samples, and by reducing
measurement error in bids.
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these models is based on the two-step approach discussed in detail in Bajari et al. (2013). The idea
of the two step method is based on estimation of the empirical distribution of equilibrium outcome
directly from the data in the first step. In the second step this empirical distribution is plugged into
the first-order condition for each player to obtain this player’s payoff (or value in case of auctions).
This literature, however, does not consider the question of comparing different mechanisms in terms
of the possibility to infer the parameters of another mechanism. The mechanism that generates
the data is usually taken as given. Such an analysis has, however, been considered in non-strategic
environments in Chernozhukov et al. (2013). The non-strategic structure of the environment makes
it significantly easier to analyze, provided that one does not need to recover the best response
correspondence from the empirical observations, which is one of the key components of our analysis.
In the mechanism design literature, the problem of designing mechanisms to enable learning the
parameters of a market has not been considered from a theoretical perspective previously. Several
works have considered the problem of learning optimal pricing schemes in an online setting (e.g.,
Babaioff et al. (2012)). However, these works assume non-strategic behavior on part of the agents,
which makes the inference much simpler. Other works consider the problem of learning click-
through-rates in the context of a sponsored search auction (a generalization of the position envi-
ronment we study) while simultaneously obtaining good revenue (e.g., Devanur and Kakade (2009);
Babaioff et al. (2009); Gatti et al. (2012)), however, they restrict attention to truthful mechanisms,
and again do not require inference.
Several works have considered the problem of empirically optimizing the reserve price of an
auction in an online repeated auction setting (e.g., Reiley (2006); Brown and Morgan (2009);
Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011)). The most notable of these is the work of Ostrovsky and Schwarz
(2011). Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011) adapt their mechanism over time to respond to empirical
data by determining the optimal reserve price for the empirically observed distribution, and then
setting a reserve price that is slightly smaller. This allows for inference around the optimal reserve
price and ensures that the mechanism quickly adapts to changes in the distribution.
Finally, the theory that we develop for optimizing revenue over the class of iron by rank auctions
is isomorphic to the theory of envy-free optimal pricing developed by Hartline and Yan (2011).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Auction Theory
A standard auction design problem is defined by a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of n ≥ 2 agents, each with a
private value vi for receiving a service. The values are bounded: vi ∈ [0, 1]; They are independently
and identically distributed according to a continuous distribution F . If xi indicates the probability
of service and pi the expected payment required, agent i has linear utility ui = vixi − pi. An
auction elicits bids b = (b1, . . . , bn) from the agents and maps the vector b of bids to an allocation
x˜(b) = (x˜1(b), . . . , x˜n(b)), specifying the probability with which each agent is served, and prices
p˜(b) = (x˜1(b), . . . , x˜n(b)), specifying the expected amount that each agent is required to pay. An
auction is denoted by (x˜, p˜).
Standard payment formats In this paper we study two standard payment formats. In a first-
price format, each agent pays his bid upon winning, that is, p˜i(b) = bi x˜i(b). In an all-pay format,
each agent pays his bid regardless of whether or not he wins, that is, p˜i(b) = bi.
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Feasibility in position auction environments Auction designers face a feasibility constraint
that restricts the allocations x that the mechanism may produce. In this paper we focus on position
auction environments. In such environments, the feasibility constraint is given by position weights
1 ≥ w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wn ≥ 0. An allocation function assigns agents (randomly) to positions 1
through n, and an agent assigned to position i gets allocated wi. In other words, an allocation
x = (x1, . . . , xn), sorted so that x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xn, is feasible if and only if it can be obtained by
shifting weight downward (or discarding), i.e., for all k ∈ [n], ∑j≤k xj ≤∑j≤k wj .
Bayes-Nash equilibrium The values are independently and identically distributed according
to a continuous distribution F . This distribution is common knowledge to the agents. A strategy
si for agent i is a function that maps the value of the agent to a bid. The distribution of values
F and a profile of strategies s = (s1, · · · , sn) induces interim allocation and payment rules (as a
function of bids) as follows for agent i with bid bi.
x˜i(bi) = Ev−i∼F [x˜i(bi, s−i(v−i))] and
p˜i(bi) = Ev−i∼F [p˜i(bi, s−i(v−i))] .
Agents have linear utility which can be expressed in the interm as:
u˜i(vi, bi) = vix˜i(bi)− p˜i(bi).
The strategy profile forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) if for all agents i, values vi, and al-
ternative bids bi, bidding si(vi) according to the strategy profile is at least as good as bidding bi.
I.e.,
u˜i(vi, si(vi)) ≥ u˜i(vi, bi). (1)
A symmetric equilibrium is one where all agents bid by the same strategy, i.e., s statisfies
si = s for some s. For a symmetric equilibrium, the interim allocation and payment rules are also
symmetric, i.e., x˜i = x˜ and si = s for all i. For implicit distribution F and symmetric equilibrium
given by stratey s, a mechanism can be described by the pair (x˜, p˜). Chawla and Hartline (2013)
show that the equilibrium of every auction in the class we consider is unique and symmetric.
The strategy profile allows the mechanism’s outcome rules to be expressed in terms of the
agents’ values instead of their bids; the distribution of values allows them to be expressed in terms
of the agents’ values relative to the distribution. This later representation exposes the geometry
of the mechanism. Define the quantile q of an agent with value v to be the probability that v is
larger than a random draw from the distribution F , i.e., q = F (v). Denote the agent’s value as a
function of quantile as v(q) = F−1(q), and his bid as a function of quantile as b(q) = s(v(q)). The
outcome rule of the mechanism in quantile space is the pair (x(q), p(q)) = (x˜(b(q)), p˜(b(q))).
Revenue curves and auction revenue Myerson (1981) characterized Bayes-Nash equilibria
and this characteriation enables writing the revenue of a mechanism as a weighted sum of revenues
of single-agent posted pricings. Formally, the revenue curve R(q) for a given value distribution
specifies the revenue of the single-agent mechanism that serves an agent with value drawn from
that distribution if and only if the agent’s quantile exceeds q: R(q) = v(q) (1 − q). R(0) and R(1)
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are defined as 0. Myerson’s characterization of BNE then implies that the expected revenue of a
mechanism at BNE from an agent facing an allocation rule x(q) can be written as follows:
Rev[x] = Eq
[
R(q)x′(q)
]
= −Eq
[
R′(q)x(q)
]
(2)
where x′ and R′ denote the derivative of x and R with respect to q, respectively.
The expected revenue of an auction is the sum over the agents of its per-agent expected revenue;
for auctions with symmetric equilibrium allocaton rule x this revenue is nRev[x].
Rank-based auctions In a rank-based auction, the allocation to an agent depends solely on the
rank of his bid among the other agents’ bids, and not on the actual bid. For example, a k-highest-
bids-win auction is a rank-based auction, however, a k-highest-bids-win-subject-to-reserve-bid-r
auction is not a rank-based auction.
2.2 Inference
The distribution of values, which is unobserved, can be inferred from the distribution of bids, which
is observed. Once the value distribution is inferred, other properties of the value distribution such
as its corresponding revenue curve, which is fundamental for optimizing revenue, can be obtained.
In this section we describe the basic premise of the inference assuming that the distribution of bids
known exactly.
The key idea behind the inference of the value distribution from the bid distribution is that
the strategy which maps values to bids is a best response, by equation (1), to the distribution of
bids. As the distribution of bids is observed, and given suitable continuity assumptions, this best
response function can be inverted.
The value distribution can be equivalently specified by distribution function F (·) or value func-
tion v(·); the bid distribution can similarly be specified by the bid function b(·). For rank-based
auctions (as considered by this paper) the allocation rule x(·) in quantile space is known pre-
cisely (i.e. it does not depend on the value function v(·)). Assume these functions are monotone,
continuously differentiable, and invertible.
Inference for first-price auctions Consider a first-price rank-based auction with a symmetric
bid function b(q) and allocation rule x(q) in BNE. To invert the bid function we solve for the bid
that the agent with any quantile would make. Continuity of this bid function implies that its
inverse is well defined. Applying this inverse to the bid distribution gives the value distribution.
The utility of an agent with quantile q as a function of his bid z is
u(q, z) = (v(q) − z)x(b−1(z)). (3)
Differentiating with respect to z we get:
d
dzu(q, z) = −x(b−1(z)) +
(
v(q)− z)x′(b−1(z)) ddz b−1(z).
Here x′ is the derivative of x with respect to the quantile q. Because b(·) is in BNE, the derivative
d
dzu(z, q) is 0 at z = b(q). Rarranging, we obtain:
v(q) = b(q) + x(q) b
′(q)
x′(q) (4)
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Inference for all-pay auctions We repeat the calculation above for rank-based all-pay auctions;
the starting equation (3) is replaced with the analogous equation for all-pay auctions:
u(q, z) = v(q)x(b−1(z))− z. (5)
Differentiating with respect to z we obtain:
d
dzu(q, z) = v(q)x
′(b−1(z))
d
dz
b−1(z) − 1,
Again the first-order condition of BNE implies that this expression is zero at z = b(q); therefore,
v(q) = b
′(q)
x′(q) . (6)
Known and observed quantities Recall that the functions x(q) and x′(q) are known precisely:
these are determined by the rank-based auction definition. The functions b(q) and b′(q) are ob-
served. The calculations above hold in the limit as the number of samples from the bid distribution
goes to infinity, at which point these obserations are precise.
2.3 Statistical Model and Methods
In this section we describe the errors in the estimated bid distribution and standard analyses for
rates of convergence. The main error in estimation of the bid distribution is the sampling error due
to drawing only a finite number of samples from the bid distribution.
The analyst obtains N samples from the bid distribution. Each sample is the corresponding
agent’s best response to the true bid distribution. We assume that the number of samples N is
roughly polynomial in n, the number of agents in a single auction.
We can estimate the equilibrium bid distribution b(q) as follows. Let bˆ1, · · · , bˆN denote the N
samples drawn from the bid distribution. Sort the bids so that bˆ1 ≤ bˆ2 ≤ · · · ≤ bˆN and define the
estimated bid distribution bˆ(·) as
bˆ(q) = bˆi ∀i ∈ N, q ∈ [i− 1, i)/N (7)
Definition 1. For function b(·) and estimator bˆ(·), the mean squared error as a function of the
number of samples N is
MSEb(N) = E
[
supq
∣∣b(q)− bˆ(q)∣∣2]1/2 .
The rate of convergence of an unbiased estimator, r(N), captures the dependence of the mean
squared error in terms of the number of samples N , keeping all other quantities (including, e.g., n)
constant, that is, r(N)MSE(N) = Θ(1).
We will be interested in comparing the error bounds achieved by different algorithms for infer-
ence. Accordingly, we will state these bounds in terms of the rate of convergence. We will also
state bounds on the mean squared error of the quantities we estimate, in terms of the mechanism
that generates the bids, in order to optimize for the mechanism.
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Lemma 2.1. The estimator bˆ(·) defined directly from the bids by equation (7) has a rate of con-
vergence of r(N) =
√
N and mean squared error MSEb(N) = O(supq b
′(q)/
√
2N ). Recalling that
v(q) ≤ 1 for all quantiles q, we obtain the following expressions for mean squared error in terms of
the allocation function.
(i) If the samples are generated from the first-price auction, then the mean squared error can be
evaluated as MSEb(N) = O(supq
{
x′(q)
x(q)
}
/
√
2N).
(ii) If the samples are generated from the all-pay auction, then the mean squared error can be
evaluated as MSE(N) = O(supq x
′(q)/
√
2N ).
To estimate the value distribution, as is evident from equations (4) and (6), an estimator for
the derivative of the bid function, or equivalently, for the density of the bid distribution, is needed.
Estimation of densities is standard; however, they require assumptions on the distribution, e.g.,
continuity, and the convergence rates are strictly slower. Our main results do not need to explicitly
estimate the value distribution and therefore, we defer these standard methods to Section 5 where
our technique is compared with the straightforward approach of estimating the value distribution
explicitly.
3 Rank-based auctions
One of the main contributions of this paper is to introduce a restricted class of rank-based auc-
tions for position environments that simultaneously have good performance and good econometric
properties. Recall that in a rank-based auction the allocation to an agent depends solely on the
rank of his bid among other agents’ bids, and not on the actual bid. For a position environment,
a rank-based auction assigns agents (potentially randomly) to positions based on their ranks.
Consider a position environment given by non-increasing weights w = (w1, . . . , wn). For nota-
tional convenience, define wn+1 = 0. Define the cumulative position weights W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) as
Wk =
∑k
j=1wj , and W0 = 0. We can view the cumulative weights as defining a piece-wise linear,
monotone, concave function given by connecting the point set (0,W0), . . . , (n,Wn).
A random assignment of agents to positions based on their ranks induces an expected weight to
which agents of each rank are assigned, e.g., w¯k for the kth ranked agent. These expected weights
can be interpreted as a position auction environment themselves with weights w¯. As for the original
weights, we can define the cumulative position weights W¯ as W¯k =
∑k
j=1wj . An important issue
for optimization of rank-based auctions is to characterize the inducible class of position weights.
Lemma 3.1 (e.g., Devanur et al., 2013). There is a rank-based auction with induced position
weights w¯ for position environment with weights w if and only if their cumulative weights sat-
isfy W¯k ≤Wk for all k, denoted W¯ ≤W .
Any feasible weights w¯ can be constructed from a sequence of the following two operations.
rank reserve For a given rank k, all agents with ranks between k + 1 and n are rejected. The
resulting weights w¯ are equal to w except w¯k′ = 0 for k
′ > k.
iron by rank Given ranks k′ < k′′, the ironing-by-rank operation corresponds to, when agents
are ranked, assigning the agents ranked in an interval {k′, . . . , k′′} uniformly at random to
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these same positions. The ironed position weights w¯ are equal to w except the weights on
the ironed interval of positions are averaged. The cumulative ironed position weights W¯ are
equal to W (viewed as a concave function) except that a straight line connects (k′−1, W¯k′−1)
to (k′′, W¯k′′). Notice that concavity of W (as a function) and this perspective of the ironing
procedure as replacing an interval with a line segment connecting the endpoints of the interval
implies that W ≥ W¯ coordinate-wise, i.e., Wk ≥ W¯k for all k.
Multi-unit highest-bids-win auctions form a basis for position auctions. Consider the marginal
position weights w′ = (w′1, . . . , w
′
n) defined by w
′
k = wk − wk+1. The allocation rule induced
by the position auction with weights w is identical to the allocation rule induced by the convex
combination of multi-unit auctions where the k-unit auction is run with probability w′k.
In this section we develop a theory for optimizing revenue over the class of all rank-based
auctions that resembles Myerson’s theory for optimal auction design. Where Myerson’s theory
employs ironing by value and value reserves, our approach analogously employs ironing by rank
and rank reserves. We then show that the revenue of rank-based auctions is close to optimal for
position environments. Our econometric study of rank-based auctions is deferred to Section 4.
3.1 Optimal rank-based auctions
In this section we describe how to optimize for expected revenue over the class of iron by rank
auctions. Recall that iron by rank auctions are linear combinations over k-unit auctions. The
characterization of Bayes-Nash equilibrium, cf. equation (2), shows that revenue is a linear function
of the allocation rule. Therefore, the revenue of a position auction can be calculated as the convex
combination of the revenues from the k-unit highest-bids-win auctions.
The revenue from a k-unit n-agent highest-bids-win auction with agent values drawn i.i.d. from
distribution F can be calculated in terms of the the agents revenue curve R(q) and the allocation
rule x(k:n)(q) of the k-highest-bids-win auction (for n agents). This allocation rule is precisely the
probability an agent with quantile q has one of the highest k quantiles of n agents, or at most k−1
of the n− 1 remaining agents have quantiles greater than q.
x(k:n)(q) =
k−1∑
i=0
(n−1
i
)
qn−1−i(1− q)i.
Notice that x(0:n)(q) = 0 and x(n:n)(q) = 1. The per-agent revenue obtained is Pk = Eq
[
R′(q)x(k:n)(q)
]
.
Notice that P0 = Pn = 0.
Given the multi-unit revenues, P = (P0, . . . , Pn), the problem of designing the optimal rank-
based auction is well defined: given a position environment with weights w, find the weights w¯ for
an rank-based auction with cummulative weights W¯ ≤W maximizing the sum∑k(w¯k− w¯k+1)Pk.
This optimization problem is isomorphic to the theory of envy-free optimal pricing developed by
Hartline and Yan (2011). We summarize this theory below; a complete derivation can be found in
Appendix A.
Define the multi-unit revenue curve as the piece-wise linear function connecting the points
(0, P0), . . . , (n, Pn). This function may or may not be concave. Define the ironed multi-unit revenues
as P¯ = (P¯0, . . . , P¯n) according to the smallest concave function that upper bounds the multi-unit
revenue curve. Define the multi-unit marginal revenues, P ′ = P ′1, . . . , P
′
n and P¯
′
= P¯ ′1, . . . , P¯
′
n,
as the left slope of the multi-unit and ironed multi-unit revenue curves, respectively. I.e., P ′k =
Pk − Pk−1 and P¯ ′k = P¯k − P¯k−1.
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Theorem 3.2. Given a position environment with weights w, the revenue-optimal iron-by-rank
auction is defined by position weights w¯ that are equal to w, except ironed on the same intervals as
P is ironed to obtain P¯ , and positions k for which P¯ ′k is negative are discarded (by setting w¯k = 0).
As is evident from this description of the optimal iron-by-rank auction, the only quantities that
need to be ascertained to run this auction is the multi-unit revenue curve defined by P . Therefore,
an econometric analysis for optimizing iron-by-rank auctions need not estimate the entire value
distribution; estimation of the multi-unit revenues is sufficient.
3.2 Optimal rank-based auctions with strict monotonicity
Position auctions, by definition, have non-increasing position weights w. The ironing in the iron-
by-rank optimization of the preceding section was to convert the problem of optimizing multi-unit
marginal revenue subject to non-increasing position weight, to a simpler problem of optimizing
multi-unit marginal revenue without any constraints. In this section, we describe the optimization
of rank-based auctions (i.e., ones for which position weights can be shifted only downwards or
discarded) subject to strictly decreasing position weights. This strictness is needed for insuring
good inference properties, the details of which are formalized in Section 4.
As described by Lemma 3.1, position weights w¯ are feasible as a rank-based auction in position
environment w if the cumulative position weights satisfy Wk ≥ W¯k for all k. Suppose we would
like to optimize w¯ subject to a strict monotonicity constraint w¯′k = w¯k − w¯k+1 ≥ ǫ. As non-trivial
ironing by rank always results in consecutive positions with the same weight, i.e., w¯′k = 0 for some
k, the optimal rank-based mechanism will require overlapping ironed intervals.
To our knowledge, performance optimization subject to a strict monotonicity constraint has
not previously been considered in the literature. At a high level our approach is the following.
We start with w which induces the cumulative position weights W which constrain the resulting
position weights w¯ (via its cumulative W¯ ) of any feasible rank-based auction. We view w¯ as the
combination of two position auctions. The first has weakly monotone weights y¯ = (y¯1, . . . , y¯n); the
second has strictly monotone weights ((n− 1)ǫ, (n− 2)ǫ, . . . , ǫ, 0); and the combination has weights
w¯k = y¯k+(n−k)ǫ for all k. The revenue of the combined position auction is the sum of the revenues
of the two component position auctions. Since the second auction has fixed position weights, its
revenue is fixed. Since the first position auction is weakly monotone and the second is strictly, the
combined position auction is strictly monotone and satisfies the constraint that w¯′k ≥ ǫ for all k.
This construction focuses attention on optimization of y¯ subject to the induced constraint
imposed by w and after the removal of the ǫ strictly-monotone allocation rule. I.e., w¯ must be
feasible for w. The suggested feasibility constraint for optimization of y¯ is given by position weights
y defined as yk = wk − (n− k)ǫ. Notice that, in this definition of y, a lesser amount is subtracted
from successive positions. Consequently, monotonicity of w does not imply monotonicity of y.
To obtain y¯ from y we may need to iron for two reasons, (a) to make y¯ monotone and (b)
to make the multi-unit revenue curve monotone. In fact, both of these ironings are good for
revenue. The ironing construction for monotonizing y constructs the concave hull of the cumulative
position weights Y . This concave hull is strictly higher than the curve given by Y (i.e., connecting
(0, Y0), . . . , (n, Yn)). Similarly the ironed multi-unit revenue curve given by P¯ is the concave hull
of the multi-unit revenue curve given by P . The correct order in which to apply these ironing
procedures is to first (a) iron the position weights y to make it monotone, and second (b) iron
the multi-unit revenue curve P to make it concave. This order is important as the revenue of the
11
position auction with weights y¯ is only given by the ironed revenue curve P¯ when the y¯′ = 0 on
the ironed intervals of P¯ .
Theorem 3.3. The optimal ǫ strictly-monotone rank-based auction for position weights w has
position weights w¯ constructed by
1. defining y by yk = wk − (n − k)ǫ for all k.
2. averaging position weights of y on intervals where y should be ironed to be monotone.
3. averaging the resulting position weights on intervals where P should be ironed to be concave
to get y¯
4. setting w¯ as w¯k = y¯k + (n− 1)ǫ.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows directly by the construction and its correctness.
The rank-based auction given by w¯ in position environment given by w can be implemented
by a sequence of iron-by-rank and rank-reserve operations. Such a sequence of operations can be
found, e.g., via an approach of Alaei et al. (2012) or Hardy et al. (1929).
3.3 Approximation via rank-based auctions
In this section we show that the revenue of optimal rank-based auction approximates the optimal
revenue (over all auctions) for position environments. Instead of making this performance directly
we will instead identify a simple non-optimal rank-based auction that approximates the optimal
auction. Of course the optimal rank-based auction of Theorem 3.2 has revenue at least that of this
simple rank-based auction, thus its revenue also satisfies the same approximation bound.
Our approach is as follows. Just as arbitrary rank-based mechanisms can be written as convex
combinations over k-unit highest-bids-win auctions, the optimal auction can be written as a convex
combination over optimal k-unit auctions. We begin by showing that the revenue of optimal k-unit
auctions can be approximated by multi-unit highest-bids-win auctions when the agents’ values are
distributed according to a regular distribution (Lemma 3.4, below). In the irregular case, on the
other hand, rank-based auctions cannot compete against arbitrary optimal auctions. For example,
if the agents’ value distribution contains a very high value with probability o(1/n), then an optimal
auction may exploit that high value by setting a reserve price equal to that value; On the other hand,
a rank-based mechanism cannot distinguish very well between values correspond to quantiles above
1 − 1/n. We show that rank-based mechanisms can approximate the revenue of any mechanism
that does not iron the quantile interval [1−1/n, 1] (but may arbitrarily optimize over the remaining
quantiles). Theorem 3.6 presents the precise statement.
Lemma 3.4. For regular k-unit n-agent environments, there exists a k′ ≤k such that the highest-
bid-wins auction that restricts supply to k′ units (i.e., a rank reserve) obtains at least half the
revenue of the optimal auction.
Proof. This lemma follows easily from a result of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) that states that
for agents with values drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution the revenue of the k′-unit n-agent
highest-bid-wins auction is at least the revenue of the k′-unit (n − k′)-agent optimal auction. To
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apply this theorem to our setting, let us use OPT(k, n) to denote the revenue of an optimal k-unit
n-agent auction, and recall that nPk is the revenue of a k-unit n-agent highest-bids-win auction.
When k ≤ n/2, we pick k′ = k. Then,
nPk ≥ OPT(k, n − k) ≥ (n− k)
n
OPT(k, n) ≥ 1
2
OPT(k, n),
and we obtain the lemma. Here the first inequality follows from Bulow and Klemperer’s theorem
and the third from the assumption that k ≤ n/2. The second inequality follows via by lower
bounding OPT(k, n − k) by the following auction which has revenue exactly (n−k)n OPT(k, n):
simulate the optimal k-unit n-agent on the n− k real agents and k fake agents with values drawn
independently from the distribution. Winners of the simulation that are real agents contribute to
revenue and the probability that an agent is real is (n− k)/n.
When k > n/2, we pick k′ = n/2. As before we have:
nPn/2 ≥ OPT(n/2, n/2) =
1
2
OPT(n, n) ≥ 1
2
OPT(k, n).
Lemma 3.5. For any number of agents n, distribution with revenue curve R(·), and quantile
q ≤ 1 − 1/n, there exists an integer k ≤ (1 − q)n such that the k-unit n-agent highest-bid-wins
auction is at least a quarter of nR(q), the revenue from posting price v(q).
Proof. First we get a lower bound on Pk for any k. For any value v
′, the total expected revenue of
the k-unit n-agent highest-bid-wins auction is at least v′ k times the probability that k + 1 agents
have value at least v′. The median of a binomial random variable corresponding to n Bernoulli
trials with with success probability (k + 1)/n is k + 1. Thus, the probability that this binomial is
at least k + 1 is at least 1/2. Combining these observations by choosing v′ = v(1 − (k + 1)/n) we
have,
nPk ≥ v(1 − (k + 1)/n) k/2.
Choosing k = ⌊(1 − q)n⌋ − 1, for which v(1 − (k + 1)/n) ≥ v(q), the bound simplifies to,
nPk ≥ v(q) k/2.
The ratio of Pk and R(q) = (1 − q) v(q) is therefore at least k/2(1 − q)n > k/2(k + 2), which for
q ≤ 1− 3/n (or, k ≥ 2) is at least 1/4.
For q ∈ (1 − 3/n, 1 − 1/n], we pick k = 1. Then, P1 is at least 1/n times v(q) times the
probability that at least two agents have a value greater than or equal to v(q). We can verify for
n ≥ 2 that
P1 ≥ v(q)
n
(
1− qn − n(1− q)qn−1) ≥ 1
4
(1− q) v(q).
Theorem 3.6. For regular agents and position environments, the optimal rank-based auction ob-
tains at least half the revenue of the optimal auction. For (possibly irregular agents) and position
environments, optimal rank-based auction obtains at least a quarter of the revenue of the optimal
auction that does not iron or set a reserve price on the quantile interval [1− 1/n, 1].
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Proof. In the regular setting, the theorem follows from Lemma 3.4 by noting that the optimal
auction (that irons by value and uses a value reserve) in a position environment is a convex combi-
nation of optimal k-unit auctions: since the revenue of each of the latter can be approximated by
that of a k′-unit highest-bids-win auction with k′ ≤ k, the revenue of the convex combination can
be approximated by that of the same convex combination over k′-unit highest-bids-win auctions;
the resulting convex combination over k′-unit auctions satisfies the same position constraint as the
optimal auction.
In the irregular setting, once again, any auction in a position environment is a convex combi-
nation of optimal k-unit auctions. The expected revenue of any k-unit auction is bounded from
above by the expected revenue of the optimal auction that sells at most k items in expectation.
The per-agent revenue of such an auction is bounded by R(1 − k/n), the revenue of the optimal
allocation rule with ex ante probability of sale k/n. Here R(·) is the ironed revenue curve (that
does not iron on quantiles in [1 − 1/n, 1]). R(1 − k/n) is the convex combination of at most two
points on the revenue curve R(a) and R(b), a ≤ 1−k/n ≤ b < 1−1/n. Now, we can use Lemma 3.5
to obtain an integer ka < n(1 − a) such that Pka is at least a quarter of R(a), likewise kb for b.
Taking the appropriate convex combination of these multi-unit auctions gives us a 4-approximation
to the optimal auction k-unit auction (that does not iron over the quantile interval [1 − 1/n, 1]).
Finally, the convex combination of the multi-unit auctions with ka and kb corresponds to a position
auction with that is feasible for a k unit auction (with respect to serving the top k positions with
probability one, service probability is only shifted to lower positions).
4 Inference in rank-based auctions
Recall that the performance of any rank-based auction is governed by the multi-unit revenues
P1, . . . , Pn with Pk equal to the per-agent revenue of the highest-k-agents-win auction. In order to
optimize over the class of rank based auctions, then, we need to estimate the n quantities Pk. We
now describe how to estimate these quantities from the observed bids, and how the error in the
estimation of the bid distribution translates into errors in the estimated multi-unit revenues.
Let x denote the allocation rule of the auction that we run, and let b denote the bid distribution
in BNE of this auction. Recall that x(k:n)(·) denotes the allocation rule of the highest-k-agents-win
auction. In the following, we use xk as a short-form for x
(k:n). Then, the per-agent revenue of this
auction is given by:
Pk = Eq
[
x′k(q)R(q)
]
= Eq
[
x′k(q)v(q)(1 − q)
]
We will now perform our analysis for the all-pay and first-price auction formats separately,
using the respective bid-to-value conversion equations from Section 2.
4.1 Inference for an all-pay auction
Recall that for an all-pay auction format, we can convert the bid distribution into the value dis-
tribution as follows: v(q) = b′(q)/x′(q). Substituting this into the expression for Pk above we
get
Pk = Eq
[
x′k(q)(1 − q)
b′(q)
x′(q)
]
= Eq
[
Zk(q)b
′(q)
]
where Zk(q) = (1− q)x
′
k
(q)
x′(q) .
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Writing the expectation as an integral and integrating by parts we obtain the following lemma.
Here we note that b(0) = 0 and Zk(1) = 0.
Lemma 4.1. The per-agent revenue of the highest-k-agents-win auction can be written as a linear
combination of the bids in an all-pay auction:
Pk = Eq
[−Z ′k(q)b(q)]
where Zk(q) = (1− q)x
′
k
(q)
x′(q) depends on the allocation rule of the mechanism and is known precisely.
This formulation allows us to express the error in estimation of Pk in terms of the error in
estimating the bid distribution. In particular, let Pˆk denote the estimate of Pk obtained by plugging
the bid estimator b̂(·) in the formula given by Lemma 4.1. Then we can write the error in Pk as:
|Pˆk − Pk| = Eq
[∣∣∣−Z ′k(q)(̂b(q)− b(q))∣∣∣] ≤ Eq[|Z ′k(q)|] sup
q
|̂b(q)− b(q)|
Lemma 2.1 then gives the following bound on the mean squared error for Pk:
MSEPk(N) ≤
supq b
′(q)√
2N
Eq
[|Z ′k(q)|]
We now proceed to boundEq[|Z ′k(q)|]. To this end we first note that if x is a convex combination
over the allocation rules of the multi-unit highest-bids-win auctions, then Zk has a single local
maximum (see the appendix for a proof).
Lemma 4.2. Let xk denote the allocation function of the k-highest-bids-win auction and x be any
convex combination over the allocation functions of the multi-unit auctions. Then the function
Zk(q) = (1− q)x
′
k
(q)
x′(q) achieves a single local maximum for q ∈ [0, 1].
Let Z∗k = supq Zk(q). Then, we can bound Eq[|Z ′k(q)|] by 2Z∗k − Zk(1) − Zk(0) ≤ 2Z∗k . We get
the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3. Let xk denote the allocation function of the k-highest-bids-win auction and x be
any convex combination over the allocation functions of the multi-unit auctions. Then for all k,
the mean squared error in estimating Pk from N samples from the bid distribution for an all-pay
auction with allocation rule x is:
MSEPk(N) ≤
√
2
N
sup
q
{x′(q)} sup
q
{
(1− q)x′k(q)
x′(q)
}
.
4.2 Inference from a first-price auction
Recall that in a first-price auction, we can obtain the value distribution from the bid distribution
as follows: v(q) = b(q) + x(q)b′(q)/x′(q). Substituting this into the expression for Pk we get:
Pk = Eq
[
(1− q)x′k(q)b(q) +
(1− q)x′k(q)x(q)b′(q)
x′(q)
]
= Eq
[
(1− q)x′k(q)b(q) + Zk(q)x(q)b′(q)
]
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where, as before, Zk(q) =
(1−q)x′
k
(q)
x′(q) .
Integrating the second expression by parts, we get∫ 1
0
Zk(q)x(q)b
′(q) dq = Zk(q)x(q)b(q)|10 −
∫ 1
0
(Z ′k(q)x(q) + Zk(q)x
′(q))b(q) dq
= −
∫ 1
0
Z ′k(q)x(q)b(q) dq −
∫ 1
0
(1− q)x′k(q)b(q) dq
When we put this back in the expression for Pk two of the terms cancel, and we get the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.4. The per-agent revenue of the highest-k-agents-win auction can be written as a linear
combination of the bids in a first-pay auction:
Pk = Eq
[−x(q)Z ′k(q)b(q)]
where Zk(q) = (1− q)x
′
k
(q)
x′(q) and x(q) are known precisely.
To bound the error in estimating Pk, once again we need to bound the integral
∫ 1
0 x(q)|Z ′k(q)| dq.
Recall that Zk has a single local maximum for q ∈ [0, 1] when x is a convex combination over the
multi-unit auctions. This implies the following lemma (see the appendix for a proof).
Lemma 4.5.
∫ 1
0 x(q)|Z ′k(q)| dq ≤ 2x(q∗k)Zk(q∗k) + 1 where q∗k = argmaxq Zk(q).
Using this lemma and applying Lemma 2.1 from Section 2 we get the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6. Let xk denote the allocation function of the k-highest-bids-win auction and x be
any convex combination over the allocation functions of the multi-unit auctions. Then for all k,
the mean squared error in estimating Pk from N samples from the bid distribution for a first-price
auction with allocation rule x is:
MSEPk(N) ≤
√
2
N
sup
q
{
x′(q)
x(q)
}
sup
q
{
(1− q)x(q)x′k(q)
x′(q)
}
.
4.3 Revenue versus inference tradeoff for rank-based auctions
We now consider optimizing for expected revenue over the class of rank based auctions subject
to good inferability of the parameters Pk. Recall that the revenue of a rank based auction with
position weights w and marginal weights w′ = wk −wk+1 is given by
∑
k w
′
kPk. On the one hand,
estimating the Pk’s well is important to be able to optimize w – we should place the most marginal
weight on positions with high Pk’s. On the other hand, the weights w determine the allocation
rule x as a weighted sum of the k-unit allocation rules xk, which in turn via Theorems 4.3 and 4.6
determine the error in the Pk’s – we should ensure that all positions get some minimum marginal
weight. This is the problem of finding the optimal ǫ strictly monotone rank-based auction that we
discussed in Section 3.2 (see Theorem 3.3).
We now claim that the auction returned by Theorem 3.3 obtains revenue close to the optimal
rank-based auction. In particular, one way of obtaining an ǫ strictly monotone auction given the
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estimates P̂k is to run the optimal auction with probability 1 − ǫ and with probability ǫ run the
auction that assigns equal marginal weight to every position. In particular, for every k, w′k ≥ ǫ/n.
For this auction, recall that x =
∑
k w
′
kxk, and x
′ =
∑
k w
′
kx
′
k. Therefore, for any quantile q,
x′k(q)/x
′(q) ≤ 1/w′k ≤ n/ǫ.
We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7. For every ǫ > 0, there exists a rank based auction on n agents that obtains a
1 − ǫ approximation to the optimal rank based revenue. Furthermore, from N samples of the bid
distribution, we can estimate parameters Pk for k ∈ [n] with error bounds as below:
For the first price format: |Pˆk − Pk| ≤
√
2
N
n
ǫ
sup
q
{
x′(q)
x(q)
}
For the all pay format: |Pˆk − Pk| ≤
√
2
N
n
ǫ
sup
q
{
x′(q)
}
We remark that while the theorem above gives the same upper bound on the error in estimation
for Pks for both the first price and all pay auction formats, comparing the bounds in Theorems 4.3
and 4.6 shows that the first price format is better at inference than the all pay format. Note that
the error bound can be made arbirarily small by picking a large enough sample size N .
5 Inferring the revenue curve
In the previous section we considered the problem of inferring the parameters of the position auction
from samples obtained from a first price and an all-pay auction. We now consider the problem of
infering the entire revenue curve R(·) from bid samples by first infering the value distribution. This
is relevant, for instance, if we want to estimate the revenue of an arbitrary mechanism, and if we
want to optimize for revenue over the class of all mechanisms. We find that the inference problem
becomes harder and a tight bound on revenue requires polynomially more samples as compared to
the previous setting.
5.1 Propagation of errors in inference of value distribution
In order to infer the value distribution from the bid distribution, as given in Section 2 by equations
(4) and (6), we need to estimate the derivative of the bid function b(·). Let G(·) denote the c.d.f.
for bids, that is, G(z) = b−1(z) is the probability that a random bid is no more than z. Let
g(z) = ddz b
−1(z) denote the corresponding density function. Note that g(b(q)) = 1/b′(q). We will
therefore focus on estimating g(·).
The density g(·) cannot be estimated directly from the empirical bid distribution of equation
(7) because the derivative of that distribution is undefined. Nonetheless, a number of standard
estimators are available to estimate g(·). Using such an estimator, gˆ(·), we obtain an estimator for
the derivative as follows:
bˆ′(q) = 1/gˆ(bˆ(q)). (8)
In Appendix B we formally state the requirements for an estimator of b′(·). We assume that
we know the rate of convergence for this estimator, i.e. the sequence r(N) with r(N) → ∞ as we
17
obtain more samples, such that:
E
[
sup
b
|gˆ(b)− g(b))|2
]1/2
= O(1/r(N)).
For instance, if one uses the histogram-based estimator for the density of bids, then
1
bˆ′(q)
=
1
Nh
N∑
i=1
1
{
|bˆ(q)− bi| ≤ h
}
,
where h is the bandwidth, which is selected such that hN/ log(N) → ∞ as we get more samples.
In this case given that the class of indicators 1 {|b− t| ≤ h} when t ∈ [b− ǫ, b+ ǫ] (which depends
on N) has a metric entropy of order O(ǫ), then the estimator for the derivative of the quantile
function of the bid distribution converges at rate r(N) =
√
N h.
Functional objects, such as distribution densities, can be estimated using many estimators.
If we restrict ourselves to feasible estimators (that are completely data-driven) and avoid oracle
estimators, we can talk about an feasible estimator that achieves the fastest convergence rate.
Such a convergence rate is called the optimal convergence rate. Stone (1980) established the optimal
conevergence rate for estimation of one-dimensional density, which we formulate here without proof.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that the density of bids g(·) has k derivatives. Then the optimal convergence
rate for the estimator for the density gˆ(·) is r(N) = Nk/(1+2k).
This theorem implies that there is a lower bound on the convergence rate equal to N1/3 for
estimation of distribution densities that have one derivative. At the same time, for functions that
are very smooth, the optimal convergence rate can approach the maximum rate of N1/2.
We now establish the mean-squared error of the estimator for the derivative of the bid distri-
bution.
Theorem 5.2. The mean-squared error for the estimator (8) for the derivative of the bid function
at quantile q can be represented as
MSEb′(q)(N) = E
[
(bˆ′(q)− b′(q))2
]1/2
= O
(
b′(q)2
r(N)
+
|b′′(q)|√
2N
)
The value function can now be estimated using Equation (4) or (6), as applicable.
5.2 Inference from an all pay auction
Recall that for rank based mechanisms, we know the allocation function x(q) and its derivative
x′(q) precisely. For all pay auctions Equation (6) allows us to relate the value distribution to the
bid distribution: v(q) = b′(q)/x′(q).
Let MSEb′(q)(N) = E
[
(bˆ′(q)− b′(q))2
]1/2
and MSEv(q)(N) = E
[|vˆ(q)− v(q)|2]1/2 denote the
mean squared error in b′ and v respectively.
We can express the mean squared error in R, MSER(q)(N) = E
[
(Rˆ(q)−R(q))2
]1/2
, in terms
of the error in b′ as follows. We write the revenue at quantile q as R(q) = (1− q)v(q) meaning that
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we can estimate the revenue as Rˆ(q) = (1 − q)vˆ(q) by replacing the true value with its estimated
counterpart. then
MSER(q)(N)
R(q)
=
(1− q)MSEv(q)(N)
(1− q)v(q) =
MSEb′(q)(N)/x
′(q)
b′(q)/x′(q)
=
MSEb′(q)(N)
b′(q)
.
Our goal is to bound this relative error by a quantile-dependent quantity, ǫ(q). Formally, we
require that
MSER(q)(N)
R(q)
≤ ǫ(q),
assuming that R(q) > 0. Our discussion above demonstrates that this error in turn can be expressed
in the relative error of estimation of the derivative of the bid function MSEb′(q)(N)/b
′(q). We can
now use Theorem 5.2 to obtain an error bound for the revenue curve4 and derive conditions on the
allocation rule x that bound the relative error in b′(q) by ǫ(q) at all quantiles q:
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that the allocation rule x(·) of an all-pay auction along with its second and
first derivatives satisfies for all quantiles q:
Ω(1)|x′′(q)|
ǫ(q)
√
N
≤ x′(q) ≤ O(1)ǫ(q)r(N)
v(q)
, and, N ≥ 1
2
(
v′(q)
v(q)ǫ(q)
)2
.
where r(N) is the convergence rate for the estimator of the bid density g(·). Then, the relative error
in estimating the revenue curve from N samples of the bid distribution is bounded by function ǫ(q).
Let us consider the bounds on x′ closely. The lower bound of this expression is determined by
the curvature of the allocation function and the number of samples. It requires the allocation rule
to “separate” bids within the range |x′′(q)|/√2N . The upper bound in this expression is driven
by the sampling noise in the inference of the density of bids: if the allocation rule “jumps” at a
certain quantile, the density of bids at that quantile is low and the relative error in bid density due
to sampling becomes large. Note also that the lower bound on the number of samples required is
determined by the slope of the value function, with more samples required for more concentrated
distributions.
From the upper bound on x′(q) we note that the error in estimating the revenue curve is at
best v(q)x′(q)/r(N), that is, we estimate the revenue at a rate of at most r(N).5 Recall from
Lemma 5.1 that r(N) can be as small as N1/3 if x is not sufficiently smooth. This rate is much
slower than the parametric convergence rate
√
N derived in Theorem 4.7 and means that inference
for the multi-unit revenues can be performed with much fewer samples than inference for general
mechanisms.
5.3 First price auctions
The analysis for the first-price auctions follows closely our analysis for all-pay auctions. Recall that
the value function can be obtained from the bid function and its derivative as
v(q) = b(q) +
x(q)
x′(q)
b′(q).
4Proofs for this section can be found in the appendix.
5This simplification ignores whether an allocation rule achieving this rate exists.
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The value function is estimated by replacing the bid function and its derivative with their estimated
counterparts. We further notice that the relative impact on the expected revenue can be bounded
in the same fashion as for the all-pay auctions, meaning that
MSER(q)(N)
R(q)
=
MSEv(q)(N)
v(q)
.
This allows us to write an analog of Theorem 5.3 for the first-price auctions.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose that the allocation rule x(·) of a first-price auction along with its second
and first derivatives satisfies for all quantiles q:
Ω(1)|x′′(q)|√
Nǫ(q)
≤ x′(q) ≤ O(1)x(q)r(N)ǫ(q), N ≥ 1
2
(
v′(q)
ǫ(q)
)2
.
where r(N) is the convergence rate for the estimator of the bid density g(·). Then the relative error
in estimating the revenue curve from N samples of the bid distribution is bounded by function ǫ(q).
Once again from the upper bound on x′(q), we get that the error ǫ(q) is at least x′(q)/(r(N)x(q)),
that is, the revenue curve can be estimated at best at a rate of r(N), which by Lemma 5.1 can be
as small as N1/3.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
We conclude with some observations and discussion.
• Good inference requires careful design of the mechanism. Perfect inference and perfect opti-
mality cannot be achieved together.
• We cannot achieve good accuracy in infering the revenue of an arbitrary mechanism, or in
infering the entire revenue curve. In contrast, the multi-unit revenues Pk are special functions
that depend linearly on the bid distribution (and not, for example, on bid density). This
property enables them to be learned accurately.
• Rank based mechanisms achieve a good tradeoff between revenue optimality and quality of
inference in position environments: (1) They are close to optimal regardless of the value dis-
tribution; (2) Optimizing over this class for revenue requires estimating only n parameters
Pk that, by our observation above, are “easy” to estimate accurately; (3) Rank based mech-
anisms satisfy the necessary conditions on the slope of the allocation function that enable
good inference.
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A Finding the optimal iron by rank auction
Recall that iron by rank auctions are weighted sums of multi-unit auctions. Therefore, their revenue
can be expressed as a weighted sum over the revenues Pk of k-unit auctions. We consider a position
environment given by non-increasing weightsw = (w1, . . . , wn), with w0 = 0, w1 = 1, and wn+1 = 0.
Define the cumulative position weights W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) as Wk =
∑
j≤iwj.
Define the multi-unit revenue curve as the piece-wise constant function connecting the points
(0, P0, . . . , (n, Pn). This function may or may not be concave. Define the ironed multi-unit revenue
curve as P¯ = (P¯1, . . . , P¯n) the smallest concave function that upper bounds the multi-unit revenue
curve. Define the multi-unit marginal revenues as P ′ = P ′1, . . . , P
′
n and P¯
′
= P¯ ′1, . . . , P¯
′
n as the left
slope of the multi-unit and ironed multi-unit revenue curves, respectively. I.e., P ′k = Pk−Pk−1 and
P¯ ′k = P¯k − P¯k−1.
We now see how the revenue of any position auction can be expressed in terms of the multi-unit
revenue curves and marginal revenues.
E[revenue] =
n∑
k=0
Pk w
′
k =
n∑
k=0
P ′k wk
≤
n∑
k=0
P¯k w
′
k =
n∑
k=0
P¯ ′k wk.
The first equality follows from viewing the position auction with weights w as a convex combina-
tion of multi-unit auctions (where its revenue is the convex combination of the multi-unit auction
revenues). The second and final inequality follow from rearranging the sum (an equivalent ma-
nipulation to integration by parts). The inequality follows from the fact that P¯ is defined as the
smallest concave function that upper bounds P and, therefore, satisfies P¯k ≥ Pk for all k. Of course
the inequality is an equality if and only if w′k = 0 for every k such that P¯
′
k > P
′
k.
We now characterize the optimal ironing-by-rank position auction. Given a position auction
weights w we would like the ironing-by-rank which produces w¯ (with cumulative weights satisfying
W ≥ W¯ ) with optimal revenue. By the above discussion, revenue is accounted for by marginal
revenues, and upper bounded by ironed marginal revenues. If we optimize for ironed marginal
revenues and the condition for equality holds then this is the optimal revenue. Notice that ironed
revenues are concave in k, so ironed marginal revenues are monotone (weakly) decreasing in k.
The position weights are also monotone (weakly) decreasing. The assignment between ranks and
positions that optimizes ironed marginal revenue is greedy with positions corresponding to ranks
with negative ironed marginal revenue discarded. Tentatively assign the kth rank agent to slot
k (discarding agents that correspond to discarded positions). This assignment indeed maximizes
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ironed marginal revenue for the given position weights but may not satisfy the condition for equality
of revenue with ironed marginal revenue. To meet this condition with equality we can randomly
permute (a.k.a., iron by rank) the positions that corresponds to intervals where the revenue curve
is ironed. This does not change the surplus of ironed marginal revenue as the ironed marginal
revenues on this interval are the same, and the resulting position weights w¯ satisfy the condition
for equality of revenue and ironed marginal revenue.
B Requirements for the estimator of the derivative of the bid
function
In general, we can express
p′(b) = Φn(b;G, g), and x
′(b) = Ψn(b;G, g),
where G(·) is the cdf of the distribution of bids and g(·) is the pdf. For instance, when the
mechanismM is the first-price auction, then Φn(b;G, g) = nGn−1(b) g(b) and Ψn(b;G, g) = Gn(b)+
n bGn−1(b)g(b). For the all-pay auction Φn(b;G, g) = nG
n−1(b) g(b) and Ψn(b;G, g) = 1.
Assumption 1. Suppose that
(i) Suppose that the density of bids g is bounded by a universal constant g¯. There exists an
estimator ĝ for which r (ĝ− g)(·) converges to a tight stochastic process with convergence rate
r such that r →∞ r/√nT → 0
(ii) Φn(b;G, g) and Ψn(b;G, g) are smooth functionals of G and g for each b such that for any
two pairs (G1, g1) and (G2, g2) with ‖G1 −G2‖ ≤ ε1 and ‖g1 − g2‖ ≤ ε2:
sup
b∈[0,v¯]
|Φn(b;G1, g1)− Φn(b;G2, g2)| ≤ JΦ,1n ε1 + JΦ,2n ε2
and
sup
b∈[0,v¯]
|Ψn(b;G1, g1)−Ψn(b;G2, g2)| ≤ JΨ,1n ε1 + JΨ,2n ε2
We imposed this high-level assumption to facilitate a wide range of estimators that can be used
to estimate the distribution and the density of the distribution of bids.
C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Consider estimation of the bid function using the sorted bids b(1) ≥ b(2) ≥
. . . ≥ b(N). Then the bid function is estimated as
b̂(q) = b([qN ]),
where [·] is the floor integer. We can equivalently express this function as a solution of the following
equation
1
N
N∑
i=1
1{bi ≤ b̂(q)} = q + op(1/
√
N),
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where op(1/
√
N) corresponds to the error that arizes because the empirical cdf is a step function
and identifies the true cdf in the steps of size 1/N . Let G(·) be the cdf of bids and Ĝ(·) be the
empirical cdf. Then the equation above can be rewritten as Ĝ(̂b(q)) −G(b(q)) = op(1/
√
N). Now
we decompose this expression as
Ĝ(̂b(q))−G(b(q)) = Ĝ(̂b(q))−G(̂b(q)) +G(̂b(q))−G(b(q)).
By the Donsker theorem
√
N(Ĝ(t) −G(t)) converges to a tight mean zero stochastic process G(t)
over t with covariance function such that H(t, t) = G(t)(1 −G(t)). Note that
sup
t
|H(t, t)| ≤ 1
4
.
This means that
E
[(√
N sup
t
(Ĝ(t)−G(t))
)2]
≤ 1
4
.
Next, consider the following expansion:
G(̂b(q))−G(b(q)) = g(b(q))(̂b(q)− b(q)) + o(|̂b(q)− b(q)|2).
Combining this result together with the decomposition above and recalling that b′(q) = 1/g(b(q)),
we write √
N (̂b(q)− b(q)) = −b′(q)
√
N(Ĝ(̂b(q))−G(̂b(q))) + op(1).
Then we write
E
[(√
N sup
q
(̂b(q)− b(q))
)2]
≤ sup
q
b′(q)E
[(√
N sup
t
(Ĝ(t)−G(t))
)2]1/2
.
This means that
MSEb(N) ≤
supq b
′(q)
2
1√
N
.
Then, recalling that v(q) ≤ 1 and v(q)− b(q) ≤ 1, we can replace the upper bound on b′(q) by x′(q)
for an all-pay auction and by x′(q)/x(q) for the first-price auction.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Consider the function A(q) = 1/Zk(q) = x
′(q)/(1 − q)x′k(q). x′(q) is a
weighted sum over x′j(q) for j ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}. So, A(q) is a weighted sum over terms x′j(q)/(1 −
q)x′k(q). Let us look at these terms closely.
x′j(q)
(1− q)x′k(q)
= αk,jq
k−j(1− q)j−k−1
where αk,j is independent of q. The functions q
k−j(1− q)j−k−1 are convex. This implies that A(q)
which is a weighted sum of convex functions is also convex. Consequently, it has a unique minimum.
Therefore, Zk(q) = 1/A(q) has a unique maximum.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Recall that Zi(q) has a single local maximum at quantile q
∗
i . So we get∫ 1
0
x(q)|Z ′i(q)| dq =
∫ q∗
i
0
x(q)Z ′i(q) dq −
∫ 1
q∗
i
x(q)Z ′i(q) dq
24
Integrating by parts,∫
x(q)Z ′i(q) dq = x(q)Zi(q)−
∫
x′(q)Zi(q) dq = x(q)Zi(q)−
∫
(1− q)x′i(q) dq
Therefore,∫ 1
0
x(q)|Z ′i(q)| dq = 2x(q∗i )Zi(q∗i )−
∫ q∗
i
0
(1− q)x′i(q) dq +
∫ 1
q∗
i
(1− q)x′i(q) dq < 2x(q∗i )Zi(q∗i ) + 1
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Consider the difference
bˆ′(q)− b′(q) = 1
gˆ(bˆ(q))
− 1
g(bˆ(q))
+
1
g(bˆ(q))
− 1
g(b(q))
.
Using the Taylor expansion, with probability approaching 1 we can bound
|bˆ′(q)− b′(q)| ≤ 1
g(b(q))2
|gˆ(bˆ(q))− g(bˆ(q))|+ | g
′(b(q))
g2(b(q))
||bˆ(q)− b(q)|.
Note that b′(q) = 1/g(b(q)). Also note that if we differentiate both sides of this expression with
respect to q, we obtain
b′′(q) = g′(b(q))b′(q)/g2(b(q)).
By our assumption, E[(|gˆ(bˆ(q)) − g(bˆ(q)))2]1/2 = O(1/r(N)). Also, by Lemma 2.1, |bˆ(q) − b(q)| =
O(b′(q)/(2
√
N)). Combining these results, we obtain that
E[(bˆ′(q)− b′(q))2]1/2 = O
(
b′(q)2
r(N)
+
|b′′(q)|
2
√
N
)
.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. The proof of this theorem reduces to substitution of appropriate ex-
pressions of b′(·) and b′′(·) into Theorem 5.2. For all-pay auctions b′(q) = x′(q)v(q) and b′′(q) =
x′′(q)v(q)x′(q)v′(q). Therefore, we can express
MSER(q)(N)
R(q)
= O
(
x′(q)v(q)
r(N)
+
|x′′(q)v(q) + x′(q)v′(q)|
2
√
Nx′(q)v(q)
)
.
We guarantee the bound ǫ(q) for this expression if each term is bounded by ǫ(q):
x′(q)v(q)
r(N)
,
|x′′(q)|
2
√
Nx′(q)
,
v′(q)
2
√
Nv(q)
≤ ǫ(q).
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Following the analysis of Theorem 5.3, we substitute the appropriate
expressions of b′(·) and b′′(·) into Theorem 5.2. Note that for the first-price auction
b′(q) = (v(q)− b(q))x
′(q)
x(q)
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and
b′′(q) = v′(q)
x′(q)
x(q)
+ (v(q) − b(q))x
′′(q)
x(q)
− 2(v(q)− b(q))
(
x′(q)
x(q)
)2
.
This means that we can evaluate
MSER(q)(N)
R(q)
= O
(
(v(q)− b(q))
r(N)
x′(q)
x(q)
+
∣∣∣∣v′(q)x′(q)x(q) + (v(q) − b(q))x′′(q)x(q) − 2(v(q) − b(q))(x′(q)x(q) )2∣∣∣∣
2
√
N (v(q)−b(q))r(N)
x′(q)
x(q)
)
.
To guarantee the bound ǫ(q), we need to bound each of the terms by ǫ(q). Thus, we require that
(v(q)− b(q))
r(N)
x′(q)
x(q)
,
v′(q)
(v(q) − b(q))2√N ,
|x′′(q)|
x′(q)2
√
N
,
x′(q)√
Nx(q)
≤ ǫ(q).
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